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Abstract 
This research aims to answer two questions: firstly, whether the EU itself does or does not 
possess intelligence capabilities, and secondly, if so, whether they are subject to sufficient 
parliamentary oversight.  
To answer the first question, the term 'intelligence' is defined as referring to security-related 
information, tailored to the specific needs of a decision-maker. Hence, in this work, formal 
EU bodies engaging in the production of intelligence via the intelligence activities of collec-
tion, processing, analysis, and dissemination qualify as 'EU intelligence body'. Thereby, intel-
ligence collection is argued to be performed even if the body does not engage in the collec-
tion of secret information using special powers. 
This definition is used to argue that currently, five EU bodies qualify as intelligence bodies: 
the CFSP's Satellite Centre, the Military Staff's Intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence 
Analysis Division, and the AFSJ's Europol and Frontex. As they increasingly form a unit, it is 
concluded that the EU indeed possesses an emerging intelligence system.  
On this basis, the parliamentary oversight of the EU intelligence bodies is assessed. Based on 
the definition of intelligence oversight and democratic accountability elaborated in this 
work, the European Parliament's and the Member States' parliaments' capabilities to effec-
tively oversee the EU intelligence bodies are examined. Particular attention is paid to the 
parliaments' resources and access to classified information, their influence on the intelli-
gence bodies' mandates and budgets, and their oversight of the bodies' activities.  
Thereby, several flaws are identified that hamper the parliaments' oversight. In particular, 
the CFSP intelligence bodies are found to be de facto accountable neither to national parlia-
ments, nor the European Parliament. Thus, the EU currently does not live up to its own de-
mocratic values with regard to democratic accountability. Hence, it is concluded that the 
parliamentary oversight of the EU intelligence system needs to be improved.  
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List of abbreviations 
AFET Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament 
AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
AWFs Analytical Work files, one of the two databases of Europol 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union 
CMPD Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, division within the EEAS 
Council Council of the European Union 
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy (sub-unit of the CFSP) 
CTG Counter Terrorism Group 
DROI  Subcommittee on Human Rights of the European Union, subcommittee to 
AFET 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights, effective since 1953 
ECJ Court of Justice of the European Union 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
EEAS European External Action Service, 'foreign ministry' of the EU 
EIS Europol Information System, one of the two databases of Europol 
EP European Parliament 
EU  European Union 
EUFOR European Union Force, a rapid reaction force operated by the EU 
EUMC EU Military Committee 
EUMS EU Military Staff 
FRAN Frontex Risk Analysis Network, Frontex's information network linking EU 
bodies with the Member States' national intelligence agencies 
High Representative High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
IntCen European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre (former Situation Centre) 
IntDir Intelligence Directorate of the EU Military Staff 
JSB Joint Supervisory Body of Europol, supervises its use of personnel data 
LIBE  Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European 
Parliament 
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NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NPs National Parliaments of the EU Member States 
OCTA European Organised Crime Threat Assessment, intelligence product of 
Europol 
PSC Political and Security Committee 
SatCen European Union Satellite Centre 
SEDE  Subcommittee on Security and Defence of the European Parliament, 
subcommittee to AFET 
SIAC  Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity, agreement of IntDir and IntCen to 
produce joint intelligence analyses, in force since 2007 
SitCen European Union Joint Situation Centre (now Intelligence Analysis Centre) 
TESAT EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, intelligence product of Europol 
UN / UNO United Nations Organization  
WEU Western European Union (international organization, 1948 2011) 
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1 Introduction 
"[N]either the SitCen, nor any other component of the EEAS [European External Action 
Service], is an 'intelligence service'. The High Representative has no intention to establish an 
'intelligence service' as part of the EEAS".1 With these words, the European Commission 
answered the question of a Member of the European Parliament, de facto denying that the 
European Union (EU) itself has intelligence capabilities comparable to those at the national 
level. Accordingly, the official position of for example SitCen's Director is that there is also no 
need for further parliamentary control of those capabilities in particular.2 Yet, only two 
months later, the headline of an article on the website EU Observer read "French national to 
head EU intelligence centre".3  
This apparent contradiction leads to the interesting question of whether or not the Euro-
pean Union itself possesses independent intelligence capabilities and, accordingly, whether 
there is indeed no need for improving their parliamentary control. It is not simple to find the 
answer to this question in the literature: while there is quite some information available on 
intelligence and intelligence accountability in general, only a relatively limited amount of 
scientific articles focus on the intelligence capabilities of the European Union or their 
oversight. Of those articles, the majority were written between 2006 and 2009, and thus 
before the Lisbon Treaty, which led to some changes in the EU's intelligence realm, came 
into force.4 Therefore, this work aims to fill this gap in the literature by outlining the EU's 
current intelligence capabilities and the existing parliamentary oversight provisions.  
                                                          
1
  COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2010d): 'EU Observer article of 22 February 2010'. Answer to written 
question E-1131/10 put by Martin Ehrenhauser, Brussels, 3 May 2010. 
2
  RETTMAN, Andrew (2011e): EU intelligence bureau sent officers to Libya in EU Observer, 12 April 2011. 
3
  MAHONY, Honor (2010): French national to head EU intelligence centre in EU Observer, 28 July 2010. 
4
  For example, see the articles of Hans BORN, Mai'a K. Davis CROSS, Claudia HILLEBRAND, Björn MÜLLER-WILLE, 
Jelle VAN BUUREN, James I. WALSH, Aidan WILLS.  
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Towards this aim, this work begins with defining the term 'intelligence'. The definition is 
then used to argue that five EU bodies currently engage in activities that amount to intelli-
gence functions: the Intelligence Analysis Centre (IntCen), the EU Military Staffs Intelligence 
Directorate (IntDir),the EU Satellite Centre (SatCen), Europol and Frontex. After having 
described their tasks and activities, the second part of this work focuses on the question of 
the EU intelligence's parliamentary oversight and democratic accountability. Again, these 
terms are at first defined and good standards outlined. On this basis, the oversight practices 
of the European Parliament (EP) and the National Parliaments (NPs) currently in place are 
assessed for strengths and flaws, with particular focus on the EP's and NP's influence on the 
mandates and budget, as well as their ability to efficiently oversee the data protection 
regulations and ongoing activities of the identified intelligence bodies. As a result, the work 
draws a conclusion on whether the EU's intelligence bodies are indeed subject to sufficient 
parliamentary oversight.  
However, even if there is an important scholarly debate thereon, it is not within the scope of 
this work to assess the effectiveness of the EU intelligence bodies or give recommendations 
on how to improve their performance, nor to discuss the overall need for EU intelligence 
capabilities that somewhat duplicate the existing NATO intelligence-sharing provisions.  
2 What is 'intelligence'? 
In the first part of this work, it shall be argued that the EU itself possesses intelligence 
capabilities as some EU bodies engage in intelligence activities. To do so, it is first necessary 
to define what is understood by 'intelligence'. However, as there is no universally-accepted 
definition of intelligence, one needs to be formulated for this work.5  
                                                          
5
  In this work, the terms policy-maker and decision-maker are used synonymously.  
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In this work, 'intelligence' shall be used to designate "a subset of the broader category of 
information": thus, intelligence refers to any "information that is tailored to assist a certain 
receiver's decision-making."6 This means that good intelligence is timely, objective and clear 
in outlining what is known or assumed, focuses strictly on the specific information need of 
the policy-maker, and is presented in a digestible form that allows the policy-maker to easily 
grasp the information.7 However, what information specifically constitutes intelligence to a 
decision-maker depends on what decision he has to take.8 In this work, only security-related 
information shall be examined, which focuses either on internal threats like "extremism, 
terrorism, [or] organized crime", or on external threats emanating from foreign states or 
actors.9  
From this understanding of intelligence as security-related information tailored to the needs 
of decision-makers results what qualifies in this work as an EU intelligence body: in general, 
this can be any governmental, i.e. formal, official, continually-standing EU body whose task is 
to produce intelligence by engaging in the so-called intelligence activities of collection, 
processing, analysis and dissemination. After the policy-makers have defined the topics on 
which the intelligence body is to issue intelligence, the first step for producing the latter 
consists of intelligence collection, that is, the gathering of raw data through different 
                                                          
6
  LOWENTHAL, Mark (2009): Intelligence  from secrecy to policy. Fourth Edition, CQ Press, Washington, p.1; 
MÜLLER-WILLE, Björn (2008): The effect of international terrorism on EU intelligence co-operation in: 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 46, No.1, p.52. 
7
  LOWENTHAL (2009): Intelligence  from secrecy to policy, p.1 and 147; MÜLLER-WILLE (2008): The effect of 
international terrorism', p.52; RNEC, Damir (2009): A new intelligence paradigm and the European Union 
in: Journal of Criminal justice and Security, Vol.1, p.152; WILLS, Aidan (2011): Guidebook: Understanding 
Intelligence Oversight. Guidebook by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces DCAF, p.11; 
SCHREIER, Fred (2007): The need for efficient and legitimate intelligence in: BORN, Hans and Marina CAPARINI 
(Eds., 2007): Democratic Control of Intelligence Services  Containing Rogue Elephants. Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, Farnham, UK, p.26f; Baldino: Introduction: Watching the Watchman in BALDINO, Daniel (Ed., 2010): 
Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services. The Federation Press, Leichhardt, p.15. 
8
  LOWENTHAL (2009): Intelligence  from secrecy to policy, p.1; MÜLLER-WILLE (2008): The effect of international 
terrorism', p.52. 
9
  SCHREIER (2007): The need for efficient and legitimate intelligence, p.31f. 
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means.10 This data is categorised according to its collection method: for example, SATINT 
refers to satellite imagery, HUMINT to human intelligence gathered by agents and spies, and 
OSINT to intelligence obtained from open sources.11 In the second step, the data is 
processed, for example by translating HUMINT reports, by putting different information into 
context, or by verifying the reliability of a source.12 Thirdly, the information is analysed and, 
by tailoring it to the policy-makers' needs, turned into intelligence: the significant facts are 
identified and conclusions drawn, patterns are identified, background information explained, 
and thereby, "the bits and pieces of information ... [are transformed] into something that is 
useable by policymakers."13 Finally, the resulting intelligence is disseminated to the decision-
maker, that is, moved from the intelligence producer to the consumer.14 It may take the 
form of a warning, a situation report, a risk estimate, an analysis or an assessment relevant 
to the information need of the decision-maker, and will either focus on broader, general 
trends (a strategic intelligence product) or aims to support a particular operation or 
imminent threat situation  (an operational intelligence product).15 In general, at least part of 
the intelligence products is not publicly accessible, but classified. 
 
 
                                                          
10
  LOWENTHAL (2009): Intelligence  from secrecy to policy, p.55ff; SHULSKY, Abram N. (1991): Silent Warfare  
understanding the world of intelligence. Brasseys (US) Inc., Washington, p.7. 
11
  TODD, Paul and Jonathan BLOCH (2003): Global Intelligence  The Worlds Secret Services today. A Global 
Issues Title, Zed Books, London, p.37; BRUNEAU, Thomas C. and Steven C. BORAZ (2007): Introduction: 
Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness in BRUNEAU, Thomas C. and Steven C. BORAZ 
(Eds., 2007): Reforming Intelligence. Obstacles to Democratic control and effectiveness. University of Texas 
Press, Austin, p.8. 
12
  SHULSKY (1991): Silent Warfare, p.37. 
13
  Ibid; HERMAN, Michael (1996): Intelligence power in peace and war. The Royal institute of international 
affairs, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.100. 
14
  LOWENTHAL (2009): Intelligence  from secrecy to policy, p.62ff. 
15
  SCHREIER (2007): The need for efficient and legitimate intelligence, p.31. 
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Figure 1: The Intelligence Cycle as presented by Lowenthal 
 
In the past, many intelligence scholars required that, in order to qualify as an intelligence 
body, an institution had to engage in collecting secret information with so-called special 
powers means not available to other government agencies, like the interception of 
communications or the conduct of covert surveillance.16 As such secret information was not 
available from any other sources and could be obtained only by the intelligence agencies, 
the collection of secret information became the most important function of intelligence 
bodies and was accordingly seen by some scholars as their defining feature.17 
However, this view shall not apply in this work as it is deemed outdated: with the informa-
tion revolution of the last decades, security-related information that once had to be 
                                                          
16
  WILLS (2011): Guidebook: Understanding Intelligence Oversight, p.18; SHULSKY (1991): Silent Warfare, p.1 and 
3. 
17
  WILLS, Aidan, Mathias VERMEULEN, Hans BORN, Martin SCHEININ and Micha WIEBUSCH (2011): Parliamentary 
oversight of security and intelligence agencies in the European Union. Study requested by the European 
Parliaments Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, under the auspice of the Directorate-
General for internal policies; Policy department C  citizens rights and constitutional affairs.  English version, 
PE 453.207, p.42, in analogy to Gill and Phythian; HERMAN (1996): Intelligence power in peace and war, 
p.119; SHULSKY (1991): Silent Warfare, 1 and 3. 
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collected using special powers means can nowadays be derived via the systematic process-
ing of publicly accessible sources on the internet, in scientific publications, newspapers, NGO 
articles, or TV and radio broadcasts.18 Accordingly, open-source information is increasingly 
replacing secret information as the main basis for intelligence: "80 to 90 percent" of Western 
intelligence already stems from public sources, and the US "has recently invested huge sums 
in OSINT".19  Consequently, the more OSINT gains importance, the less special powers collec-
tion is needed in order to produce good intelligence. Instead, collection increasingly refers to 
selecting the important information from "the sheer superabundance" of OSINT.20 Thus, as it 
is nowadays possible to produce good intelligence without the use of special collection 
means or secret information, an EU institution shall in this work qualify as intelligence body 
even if it uses exclusively OSINT to produce its intelligence products.21  
3 The EU's intelligence bodies 
The definition of intelligence elaborated above will be used in the next sections to argue that 
currently, five EU bodies qualify as intelligence bodies as they engage in intelligence 
activities.  With their intelligence products, they support EU decision-making in the two 
security-related policy fields of the so-called Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). 
                                                          
18
  CROSS, Mai'a K. Davis (2011): 'EU intelligence sharing & the Joint Situation Centre: a glass half-full'. Paper 
prepared for the Meeting of the European Union Studies Association, 3-5 March 2011, p.10; HERMAN (1996): 
Intelligence power in peace and war, p.101; UNITED STATES ARMY (2006): Open Source Intelligence. Field 
Manual Interim No. 2-22.9, December 2006, expired December 2008. Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, Washington, 5 December 2006, Chapter 2, paragraphs 2-2, 2-5 and 2-6. 
19
  RETTMAN, Andrew (2011h): EU intelligence services opening up to collaboration in EU Observer, 18 January 
2011; Dyèvre, Axel (2008): 'Intelligence cooperation: The OSINT option'. Open Forum article for 
EUROPOLITICS, Defence Security, 28 October 2008. 
20
  COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2010a): European Open Source Intelligence Project. Brussels, 27 April 2010, 
9037/10. Council Presidency to Ad hoc Group on Information Exchange, p.5; Dyèvre (2008): 'Intelligence 
cooperation: The OSINT option'; SHULSKY (1991): Silent Warfare, p.2. 
21
  WILLS (2011): Guidebook: Understanding Intelligence Oversight, p.10; DUKE, Simon (2006): Intelligence, 
security and information flows in CFSP in: Intelligence and National Security, Vol.21, No.4, p.609. 
10 
 
In the realm of the CFSP, the EU Member States coordinate their foreign policy action to 
strengthen their political impact.22 In this aim, the EU's interests are currently represented 
by 136 delegations around the world, and a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was 
installed as part of the CFSP when new crises emerged in the EU's neighbourhood, like 
Kosovo in the 1990s, where the EU's dependency on third parties like NATO or the US in 
crisis management became apparent.23 In the realm of the CSDP, the EU has engaged in its 
own military operations and civilian missions since 200324  to ensure its security by promot-
ing peace and preventing conflicts abroad.25 The CFSP is mainly put into effect by the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (High Representative), 
currently Catherine Ashton, and the European External Action Service (EEAS) that she 
heads.26 The EEAS serves as a 'foreign ministry' for the EU and manages the EU's crisis 
                                                          
22
  VAZ ANTUNES, Maj.Gen. João Nuno Jorge (2007): Developing an Intelligence Capability  The European 
Union in Studies in Intelligence, Vol.49, No.4. Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of 
Intelligence; Former Chairman of the EU Military Committee, General Henri Bentégeat as cited in IMPETUS  
BULLETIN OF THE EU MILITARY STAFF (2008), Autumn / Winter 2008, Issue  6, p.6. 
23
  EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE WEBPAGE: 'EEAS - What we do'; TREATY OF AMSTERDAM (1997) amending the 
Treaty on European Union, the treaties establishing the European communities and certain related acts. 
Amsterdam, 2 October 1997, paragraph 10, amending Title V, Article J.7.1., p.12; VAZ ANTUNES (2007): 
Developing an Intelligence Capability'; DUKE (2006): Intelligence, security and information flows in CFSP, 
p.606f; DCAF Backgrounder (2006): 'Contemporary Challenges for the Intelligence Community', March 2006, 
p.1; VILLADSEN, Ole R. (2000): Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy in Studies in 
Intelligence, Summer 2000, No.9; Former Chairman of the EU Military Committee, General Henri Bentégeat 
as cited in IMPETUS  BULLETIN OF THE EU MILITARY STAFF (2008), Autumn / Winter 2008, Issue  6, p.6. 
24
  Currently, three EU military operations are taking place (EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina; EUNAVFOR 
Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden; and EUTM Somalia). Additionally, twelve EU civilian missions are being 
conducted (EULEX Kosovo, EUCAP Sahel in Niger, EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian territory, EUBAM Rafah, 
EUSEC RD Congo, EUPOL RD Congo, EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine, EUMM Georgia, EUPOL Afghanistan, 
EUJUST LEX in Iraq, EUCAP Nestor in Somalia, and EUAVSEC South-Sudan). Correct as of August 2012. 
EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE WEBPAGE: 'Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union 
August 2012'. 
25
  VILLADSEN (2000): Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy; DUKE (2006): Intelligence, security 
and information flows in CFSP, p.606 and 616; Former Chairman of the EU Military Committee, General 
Henri Bentégeat as cited in IMPETUS  BULLETIN OF THE EU MILITARY STAFF (2008), Autumn / Winter 2008, Issue  
6, p.6; TREATY OF AMSTERDAM (1997) amending the Treaty on European Union ..., paragraph 10, amending 
Title V, Article J.7.2., p.12; BORN, Hans, Suzana ANGHEL, Alex DOWLING and Teodora FUIOR (2008): 
Parliamentary Oversight of ESDP Missions. Policy Paper No.28 of the Geneva Center for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), p.1f. 
26
  See Agendas and Statements of the High Representative on the EEAS main webpage www.eeas.europa.eu. 
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response actions.27 For this purpose, it incorporates "all key military and civilian crisis 
management units" of the EU, such as the EU Military Staff (EUMS), tasked with strategic 
planning for military operations, and the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate 
(CMPD), responsible for the coordination of both military and civilian crisis management 
activities and the actions of third parties like NATO or UNO.28  
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High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
European External Action Service
EU crisis management structures
 
Figure 2: Organisational chart of the European External Action Service, indicating the relative positions of the Intelligence 
Analysis Centre, the EU Military Staff, and the Satellite Centre as independent agency of the EU 
 
                                                          
27
  CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (2010) as amended by the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. 
Published in the Official Journal of the European Union, 30 March 2010, C 83/27, Articles 18 and 27(3) TEU; 
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2010c): 'Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and 
functioning of the European External Action Service', 2010/427/EU, reasoning number 3, p. L 201/30. 
28
  RETTMANN, Andrew (2010i): 'Ashton set for conciliatory dinner with defence ministers' in EU Observer, 23 
April 2010; COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2008f): 'EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and 
Strategic level'. European Union Military Staff to the European Union Military Committee, Brussels, 16 June 
2008, 10687/08, p.7; EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE WEBPAGE: 'CSDP structures and instruments'. 
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Several EU bodies engage in CFSP decision-making: the European Council, composed of the 
Heads of State or Government of the Member States, decides on the general objectives and 
basic guidelines for the CFSP.29 Following this, the Foreign Ministers in the Council take the 
decisions necessary to implement the CFSP, for instance whether to initiate a mission.30 The 
Council is advised by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which comprises senior 
representatives of each Member State and issues opinions on available policy options.31 The 
PSC is in turn advised on military questions by the EU Military Committee, composed of the 
Chiefs of Defence of the Member States.32 It will be argued that these CFSP decision-making 
bodies receive intelligence support from the EU bodies SatCen, IntDir, and IntCen, which 
provide them with background, warning, and assessments of risks or likely implications for 
the EU's security.33  
In contrast, the alleged EU intelligence bodies Europol and Frontex fall within the realm of 
the AFSJ. Under the notion of AFSJ, various EU policies are united that shall improve the 
cooperation of the  Member States in policing and judicial questions to tackle issues affect-
ing the internal security of the EU, like illegal trafficking, terrorism or organized crime.34 EU-
level cooperation on these issues is especially necessary as the abolishment of the EU 
                                                          
29
  CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (2010) as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, Article 26 
TEU. 
30
  Ibid. 
31
   Ibid. Article 38 TEU. 
32
  COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002b): Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis 
management. Council of the European Union Secretariat to the Delegations, Brussels, 9 January 2002, 
14613/01, p.9f. 
33
  LOWENTHAL (2009): Intelligence  from secrecy to policy, p.3; RNEC (2009): A new intelligence paradigm', 
p.152; WILLS (2011): Guidebook: Understanding Intelligence Oversight, p.11; SCHREIER (2007): The need for 
efficient and legitimate intelligence, p.15; DUKE (2006): Intelligence, security and information flows in CFSP, 
p.616f; NOMIKOS, John M. (2005): A European Union intelligence service for confronting terrorism, p.198. 
34
  CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2010) as amended by the 
Lisbon Treaty of 2007. Published in the Official Journal of the European Union, 30 March 2011, C 83/73, 
Article 67(3) TFEU; HILLEBRAND, Claudia (2011): Guarding EU-wide counter-terrorism policing: the struggle 
for sound parliamentary scrutiny of Europol in: Journal of Contemporary European Research, Vol.7, No.4, 
p.505. 
13 
 
internal borders limited the Member States' capabilities to successfully combat these 
problems on their own.35 AFSJ measures comprise, for example, the European Arrest 
Warrant, joint border patrols, the freezing of money assets of suspected terrorists, and the 
Schengen Information System, a common database for police and immigration authorities.36  
AFSJ policies are mainly implemented by the Commission, in particular by its Directorates for 
Justice and Home Affairs. 
With regard to AFSJ decision-making, the European Council decides on the strategic guide-
lines of the AFSJ in multi-annual working programmes  the current Stockholm programme is 
in effect from 2010 to 2014.37 Other than for the CFSP, the European Parliament (EP), how-
ever, shares responsibility for decision-making with the Council.38  In AFSJ-matters, the latter 
comprises the Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs.  
Thus, having outlined the policy areas in which the EU needs intelligence support, the follow-
ing sections argue that five EU bodies qualify as intelligence bodies according to the defini-
tion used in this work. To argue this, it is necessary to examine whether they are 
governmental EU bodies tasked to produce intelligence, and to outline their activities in 
collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence products to CFSP or AFSJ 
decision-making bodies.  
                                                          
35
  WALSH, James Igoe (2009): 'Security Policy and Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union'. Paper 
prepared for the biennial meeting of the European Union Studies Association, Los Angeles, April 2009, p.5f. 
36
  CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2010) as amended by the 
Lisbon Treaty, Article 75 TFEU; EUROPA SUMMARIES OF EU LEGISLATION: 'The Schengen area and cooperation'. 
37
  Ibid. Article 68 TFEU; RIPOLL-SERVENT, Ariadna (2010): 'Point of no return? The European Parliament after 
Lisbon and Stockholm' in: European Security, Vol.19, No.2, p.192; THE STOCKHOLM PROGRAMME (2010): 'An 
open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens'. Published in the Official Journal of the European 
Union, part IV (notices), from the European Council, 4 May 2010, C 115/20. 
38
  CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2010) as amended by the 
Lisbon Treaty, Articles 74, 77(2), 79(2), 81(2), 82(1)2, 87(2) TFEU. 
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3.1 The EU Satellite Centre 
The first EU body whose intelligence function is examined is the European Union Satellite 
Centre (SatCen), situated in Torrejón de Ardoz in Spain.39   
Formal EU body tasked to provide intelligence 
SatCen was originally founded in 1991 as an institution of the Western European Union 
(WEU), an intergovernmental organisation distinct from the EU.40 However, as the WEU's 
tasks were increasingly duplicated in the EU, its members agreed to dismantle the WEU, 
transferring its capabilities to the EU.41 Accordingly, in July 2001, the WEU SatCen structures 
were assigned to the EU and it became an official EU agency.42  SatCen is tasked to "support 
the decision-making of the European Union in the field of the CFSP ... by providing ... prod-
ucts resulting from the analysis of satellite imagery and collateral data".43  To fulfil this task, 
its staff in 2011 comprised 104 image analysts, geospatial specialists and support personnel 
plus four seconded national experts, and its budget was more than 17 million.44 
                                                          
39
  COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2001c): 'Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001 on the establishment of a 
European Union Satellite Centre'. 2001/555/CFSP, published in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities, 25 July 2001, Article 1, p. L 200/5; EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE MAIN WEBPAGE. 
40
  VILLADSEN (2000): Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy. The WEU was mandated to ensure 
the collective self-defence and economic, social and cultural collaboration of its Member States. See  THE 
BRUSSELS TREATY AS AMENDED BY THE PARIS AGREEMENTS (1954): Brussels Treaty, signed on 17 March 1948, 
amended by the Paris Agreements, signed on 23 October 1954. 
41
  WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION WEBPAGE: 'History of WEU'; WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (2000): 'Marseille Declaration'. 
WEU Council of Ministers, Marseille, 13 November 2000, see in particular paragraph 6; WESTERN EUROPEAN 
UNION (2010): 'Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU on behalf of the High 
Contracting Parties to the Modified Brussels Treaty  Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom'. Decision to close the WEU, Brussels, 31 March 
2010. 
42
  COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2001c): 'Council Joint Action  on the establishment of a European Union 
Satellite Centre', reasoning 1, p. L 200/5. 
43
  COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011d): ' Council Joint Action 2001/555/CFSP of 20 July 2001 on the 
establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre amended by Joint Action 2006/998/CFSP, Joint Action 
2009/834/CFSP and Council Decision 2011/297/CFSP'. Statute of the Satellite Centre as published on its 
webpage, 25 August 2011, Article 2(1), p.1. 
44
  EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE (2011): Annual Report 2011, 4. Resource Management, p.29ff; EUROPEAN 
UNION SATELLITE CENTRE MAIN WEBPAGE. 
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Collection 
SatCen's products are based on SATINT, meaning optical satellite data and radar imagery.45  
It collects the necessary raw data primarily by purchasing it, for example from commercial 
partners or from Indian, Russian or US satellites.46 Furthermore, SatCen increasingly formed 
agreements with EU Member States, currently Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Belgium and 
Greece, to receive their governmental satellites' imagery.47 Additionally, SatCen collects its 
own OSINT to underpin the imagery.48  
While some scholars doubt SatCen's ability to guarantee the provision of good intelligence in 
a crisis situation due to its dependence on commercial and foreign input, it actively tries to 
diminish this dependence through further arrangements with Member States and commer-
cial providers that give SatCen's orders maximum priority.49 According to its annual report of 
2011, SatCen is optimistic to thereby acquire more and better imagery.50 
To conclude, despite the fact that SatCen "neither owns nor operates any satellites", it en-
gages in intelligence collection according to the definition elaborated in this work.51  
 
                                                          
45
  DUKE (2006): Intelligence, security and information flows in CFSP, p.622; EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE 
(2011): Annual Report 2011, p.10. 
46
  NOMIKOS (2005): A European Union intelligence service', p.193f. 
47
  DUKE (2006): Intelligence, security and information flows in CFSP, p.622; EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE 
(2011): Annual Report 2011, p.10. 
48
  Ibid. The four subdivisions are: Data Preparation and Dissemination; Crisis Support and Situation 
Assessment; Mapping and Remote Sensing; and Non-Proliferation. See EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE MAIN 
WEBPAGE. 
49
  VILLADSEN (2000): Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy; WALSH (2009): 'Security Policy and 
Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union'. Paper prepared for the biennial meeting of the European 
Union Studies Association, Los Angeles, April 2009, p.16; COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011b): Main 
aspects and basic choices of the CFSP: Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament  2010. Brussels, 6 July 2011, 12562/11, 
p.65; EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE (2011): Annual Report 2011, p.21f. 
50
  EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE (2011): Annual Report 2011. 
51
  NOMIKOS (2005): A European Union intelligence service', p.193f. 
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Processing and analysis 
The collected SATINT is analysed in SatCen's Operations Division.52 By adding OSINT and 
assembling the pictures into meaningful contexts, it is turned into products such as inter-
preted satellite imagery, maps or charts indicating the exact geographic character of a loca-
tion where the EU plans to deploy a military operation, or timeline-images showing the 
movements of armed groups or refugees in a crisis region.53 Also, SatCen tailors the SATINT 
to the specific information need of the consumer, for example strategic analyses to assure 
the general security surveillance of areas of interest, to monitor the environmental situation, 
or to assist in verifying the implementation of arms control treaties. Furthermore, since its 
mandate was enlarged in 2006, SatCen produces operational analyses to support the 
preparation and conduct of EU missions and operations abroad.54 The finished SatCen intelli-
gence products  over 700 in 2011  are disseminated on CD-ROM or DVD.55  
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Figure 3: Organisational chart of the EU Satellite Centre 
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  EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE (2011): Annual Report 2011, p.10. 
53
  COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011d): Statute of the Satellite Centre, Article 2(2), p.1; EUROPEAN UNION 
SATELLITE CENTRE PRESENTATION: Director of SatCen, Toma Lovreni, presentation to the European 
Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defence, 18 March 2010, slides 7, 14, 16, 17; VILLADSEN (2000): 
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  DUKE (2006): Intelligence, security and information flows in CFSP, p.622; in analogy to VILLADSEN (2000): 
Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy.  
55
  EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE (2011): Annual Report 2011, p. 7 and 18. 
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Dissemination to EU decision-makers 
The priority consumers of SatCen's products are CFSP-related bodies: the High Representa-
tive, the EEAS's crisis management structures including the EU Military Staff and IntCen, the 
PSC, and the Commission.56 Furthermore, operational analyses are disseminated to the EU 
personnel involved in EU missions and operations.57 Finally, EU Member States and third 
parties (like third-party states or international organisations like UNO and NATO) may also 
submit a request to SatCen. Taking into account the relevance of the request and SatCen's 
capacities, the High Representative decides whether SatCen shall provide the relevant 
product.58  
The demand for SatCen's products recently increased considerably due to the emergence of 
"wider and more complex" crisis situations: thus, during the Arab revolts in 2010/2011, 
SatCen "was literally overwhelmed" by requests to support decision-making at EU level and 
military operations like EUFOR Libya or NATO's Operation Unified Protector.59 
To conclude, having outlined that SatCen is a formal EU body tasked to produce intelligence 
and engaging in collection, analysis and dissemination, the assumption that it qualifies as EU 
intelligence body is confirmed. 
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  EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE MAIN WEBPAGE. 
57
  EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE (2011): Annual Report 2011, p.9. 
58
  COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011d): ' Council Joint Action 2001/555/CFSP of 20 July 2001 on the 
establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre amended by Joint Action 2006/998/CFSP, Joint Action 
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18 
 
3.2 The EUMS's Intelligence Directorate 
The second body examined in this work to assess whether it qualifies as EU intelligence body 
according to the given definition is the Intelligence Directorate (IntDir) of the EU Military 
Staff (EUMS).60 
Formal EU body tasked to provide intelligence 
IntDir is the largest division of the EUMS, which itself was established as a formal EU body at 
the meeting of the European Council in Helsinki 1999 to provide "military expertise and sup-
port [to EU decision-making bodies] for the implementation of the security and defence 
policy".61 In 2010, the EUMS was transferred under the direction of the EEAS where it has 
primary responsibility for the strategic planning of the military part in EU crisis management 
operations.62 IntDir is responsible for providing the military intelligence, early warning and 
situation assessments necessary to enable the EUMS in the fulfilment of its tasks.63 To do so, 
IntDir employs 41 staff, of which 39 are seconded experts from national intelligence services, 
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  Even if also in current texts often refer to as Intelligence Division, the former Intelligence Division was 
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question E-006027/2012 put by Martin Ehrenhauser, Brussels, 7 August 2012; COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION (2009c): Products of the EU Military Staffs Intelligence Division. Preliminary Draft Reply to written 
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and is organised in three units: Policy, Support and Production.64 Its budget is included in the 
general EUMS budget and therefore unknown.65 
Strictly speaking, the EUMS is the formal EU body tasked to provide military intelligence. 
However, in order to keep the focus, IntDir in particular shall be examined further as the 
intelligence body. 
Collection 
As most of the strategic and operational military intelligence necessary for the EUMS's tasks 
is not accessible via open sources, IntDir mainly uses information from finished intelligence 
products that are provided by the national intelligence services.66 Thus, IntDir receives no 
raw data from the national agencies. As the national intelligence services share their 
information on a strictly voluntary basis and have no duty to support IntDir, IntDir tries to 
actively maintain close relations with the national services to ensure it receives sufficient 
information.67 For example, IntDir's seconded staff members function as points of contact 
with their parent national intelligence service by acting as a "secure communication link" to 
directly transmit IntDirs intelligence needs or by indicating whether their parent agency has 
information on a specific topic.68 In the same aim, IntDir organises the annual Intelligence 
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  EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2012e): 'Intelligence Division (INT)'. Answer to question E-006027/2012, 7 August 
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  WALSH (2009): 'Security Policy and Intelligence Cooperation', p.15; VAZ ANTUNES (2007): Developing an 
Intelligence Capability'. 
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Spring/Summer 2011, Issue  11, p.8 VAZ ANTUNES (2007): Developing an Intelligence Capability'. 
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Directors Conclave in Brussels, an informal meeting of IntDir's staff with the Directors of the 
national defence intelligence organisations.69 Due to its dependence on national inputs, 
IntDir is somewhat limited in its scope to topics that the Member States are also interested 
in.70  
In addition to using national inputs, IntDir also requests products from the EU Satellite 
Centre.71 To improve this collection, it established a Geospatial Cell in its Support Branch in 
2009.72 Finally, IntDir is very likely to collect OSINT as background information.73 
Processing and Analysis 
In a first processing step, IntDir "cleans [all] shared intelligence of information that could 
identify its source" in order to mask the identity of the providing national agency.74 The 
information is then analysed in IntDir's Production Branch, where analysts are grouped into 
six thematic and regional task forces.75 The resulting products are tailored to the information 
need of the consumer, for example by monitoring a potential crisis region or by assessing 
the military capacities of the conflict-parties in a region where the EU plans to engage.76 
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In addition to IntDir's independent analyses, it also engages in producing joint assessments 
together with another EU intelligence body, IntCen. Since January 2007, the Single 
Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) agreement demands that IntCen and IntDir combine all 
their information to issue a joint product after a joint analysis.77  
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Figure 4: Organisational chart of the Intelligence Directorate 
 
Dissemination 
IntDir's products are mainly disseminated to the Director-General of the EUMS which trans-
mits it to the Military Committee, which advises the PSC on military policy options.78 Via the 
PSC, the Council is supported by IntDir's products, as, for example, in its choice of whether to 
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 on the establishment of the Military Staff of the 
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(2009c): Products of the EU Military Staffs Intelligence Division. Preliminary Draft Reply, 21 September 
2009. 
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initiate an EU military operation. Additionally, the High Representative, IntCen, the Commis-
sion and the defence intelligence services of the Member States receive IntDir's products.79  
Furthermore, the demands "in quality and quantity" for IntDir's products have "considera-
bly" grown over time, probably due to the growing engagement of the EU in military activi-
ties in general.80  
To conclude, again in this case, the assumption according to which IntDir qualifies as EU 
intelligence body was confirmed. 
3.3 The Intelligence Analysis Centre  
The last CFSP-related body that is examined on whether it engages in intelligence activities is 
the Intelligence Analysis Centre (IntCen), situated in Brussels. 
Formal EU body tasked to provide intelligence 
IntCen's roots lie with two former intelligence bodies of the EU: the Joint Situation Centre 
(SitCen) and the Crisis Room.81 The Crisis Room, established under the Commission in 2001, 
analysed OSINT and ensured the communication between the Commission and its delega-
tions during crises.82 In contrast, SitCen was originally established as a WEU structure and, 
like SatCen, was transferred to the EU in 2000 to support the newly-established CSDP 
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policy.83 In 2011, SitCen and the Crisis Room were joined into a new body, IntCen, which 
forms an independent branch of the EEAS.84 IntCen continues to be structurally adjusted; for 
example, SitCen's 24 hours / 7 days crisis monitoring unit was apparently transferred to the 
EU Situation Room, and in March 2012, parts of two of its units were shifted to other EEAS 
departments.85 IntCen's staff currently numbers "close to 70", while it has "no annual budget 
of its own as it is part of the EEAS".86 
IntCen inherited SitCen's core tasks.87 These fall into two categories: on the one hand, IntCen 
supports CFSP decision-making, for example by providing early warning of external threats, 
and risk assessments to support ongoing or planned EU crisis management operations.88 On 
the other hand, since the Madrid bombings in 2004, SitCen was and IntCen now is tasked to 
provide strategic intelligence on terrorist threats to the EU and give advice to the Member 
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States "on possible preparatory action" if it identified flaws in their counterterrorism 
policy.89 Thus, IntCen "bridge[s] the gap" by providing intelligence on both internal and 
external threats.90  
Collection 
IntCen collects information from various sources. Firstly, IntCen inherited the Crisis Room's 
"considerable expertise" in the collection of OSINT.91 Secondly, IntCen's staff allegedly travel 
routinely to crisis zones to overtly collect first-hand impressions, for example to Libya in 
2011.92 Furthermore, IntCen may request products from SatCen and has information-sharing 
agreements with the Commission, Council, Frontex, Europol and IntDir, and with the situa-
tion centres of the African Union and UN peacekeeping operations.93  
In addition, IntCen receives a multitude of 'grey' intelligence, that is, information that is not 
strictly secret but also not accessible to the wider public.94 This category includes the 
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"frequent and substantial situation report[s] provided [to the EEAS] by [the EU] delegations", 
by the EU crisis-management missions and operations, and by the EU's Special Representa-
tives assigned to certain crisis regions.95  Coming from in situ, these reports contain valuable 
background information to put events into the local context.96  Having been transferred 
under the EEAS's authority in 2011, IntCen now has much more direct access to this informa-
tion than when it was structurally separated, and it may even directly task these EU 
representatives "with gathering vital information on its behalf".97  
Thus, collecting considerable information on its own, IntCen is overall probably less depend-
ent on information input from national intelligence services than IntDir.98 Nevertheless, it 
naturally uses the finished intelligence products provided on a voluntary basis by its 
seconded national intelligence agents.99 Additionally, IntCen is the only EU body to be 
(indirectly) provided with both internal and external intelligence from the national services: 
it receives military intelligence via IntDir (based on the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity 
(SIAC) of 2007), and terrorism-related intelligence via the so-called Counter Terrorism 
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Group.100 Allegedly, such national inputs have improved considerably in quantity and quality 
since 2005.101 
To conclude, overall, out of the bodies examined so far, IntCen makes use of the broadest 
input. 
Director IntCen
Analysis Division General and external 
relations Division
IT Questions Open Source Office
High 
Representative
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Communication, legal 
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Intelligence Analysis Centre
 
Figure 5: Organisational chart of the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre, as far as deduced from public sources 
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Processing and Analysis 
Both divisions of IntCen engage in analysing the collected information: thus, the General and 
external relations division comprises an "open source office" staffed with 21 analysts 
responsible for OSINT analysis, while the majority of analysts are situated in the Analysis 
Division, composed of six sections concentrating on different geographical areas or 
themes.102 This structural separation of OSINT from analysis of other sources is somewhat 
bewildering, but possibly explained by the composition of the Analysis Division's seconded 
agents (who account for "about 70 percent" of IntCen's total staff).103 Thus, not all Member 
States are allowed to second agents to IntCen.104  Instead, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Great Britain decide on whom to accept: as the seconded 
agents have direct access to the intelligence provided by the national services to IntCen, 
they only allow agents from those States they fully trust.105 The excluded States accept this 
situation, possibly because IntCen's products are not the only reports issued to the decision-
makers and therefore, the privileged States' higher influence on IntCen's analysis does still 
not determine the policy outcome.106 However, as this selection is apparently not applied to 
IntCen's OSINT analysts, the Member States might want to keep them structurally apart. 
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On the one hand, IntCen analyses the information jointly with IntDir, as demanded by the 
SIAC.107 On the other hand, IntCen's analysts fuse the information collected by the various 
means into its own mainly strategic all-source intelligence products, like "strategic situation 
and risk assessments", "quarterly ... and six monthly" assessments tailored to specific crises 
and "daily news bulletins based on open sources".108 Overall, IntCen might thereby issue 
"more than 150 reports per year" tailored to CFSP decision-makers and terrorism.109   
Dissemination 
IntCen's main-task is to support EU decision-making.110 Accordingly, its products are primar-
ily disseminated to the High Representative, the EEAS crisis management structures, and the 
PSC, as well as to the Council, the Commission and Europol and Frontex.111 As these EU 
decision-making bodies comprise representatives from all EU Member States, all 27 receive 
the intelligence even if not all contributed by providing input.112 Some consumers have criti-
cised IntCen's products for being neither timely nor adding new information, possibly 
because the High Representative tasked it with questions to which "you could get the 
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answers on Google".113 Despite this critique, IntCen's products successfully "helped [to] initi-
ate and stimulate policy discussion ... [and] contributed to valuable evolutions in EU policy", 
and 75 of its recommendations on counterterrorism were adopted.114 As a secondary prior-
ity, national civilian and military services are also provided with information such as terrorist 
threat assessments, and Member States may ask IntCen to report on specific topics of 
common interest.115 
To conclude, the last CFSP-related body examined also qualifies, as was assumed, as an 
intelligence body as IntCen is, as part of the EEAS, a formal EU body tasked to provide intelli-
gence, and it engages in all four intelligence activities. 
3.4 Europol 
Having examined the EU bodies providing intelligence in the realm of CFSP, the first AFSJ-
related body examined is the European Police Office (Europol), situated in The Hague, 
Netherlands.  
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Formal EU body tasked to produce intelligence 
Europol was originally set up as an intergovernmental body outside EU structures, based on 
a treaty signed by the Member States in 1992.116 However, in January 2010, Europol was 
transformed into an official EU agency.117  
Europol is tasked with supporting the national police services in combating terrorism and 
serious crime affecting the internal security of the EU by enhancing their cooperation.118 
Towards this aim, Europol engages in activities such as facilitating information-sharing 
between the national services by providing a liaison network, promoting the harmonization 
of investigation techniques, and providing "intelligence and analytical support to Member 
States".119 To fulfil the latter task, Europol collects, processes, and analyses intelligence.  
Collection 
Unlike the bodies examined so far, Europol collects and uses personal data, mainly to pro-
duce operational intelligence.120 As this information is not available through open sources 
and as Europol lacks the means to gather personal raw data itself, it depends on data input 
from the national law enforcement and intelligence services of the EU Member States.121 
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Thus, for Europol to deliver useful intelligence, the Council recognised it as an "essential 
precondition" that the national agencies "systematically provide all relevant intelligence".122 
Towards this aim, Europol's national liaison officers shall ensure the direct transmission of 
information from the national agencies.123 Yet, despite this liaison system, the national 
services are allegedly still reluctant to share their information with Europol for fear of their 
autonomy.124 However, this lack of effectiveness in personal data collection does not dimin-
ish Europol's overall collection function. 
In addition to personal data, Europol collects OSINT, purchases commercial information and 
has established information-sharing agreements with EU bodies like the Commission, 
Frontex and IntCen, and third-party states and international organisations like Interpol.125  
Processing and Analysis 
Europol files the collected information in two databases: on the one hand, the Europol 
Information System (EIS) contains limited basic information about individuals and groups 
suspected of crimes. This data pool is accessible to all national police agencies, which can 
also enter their own data. On the other hand, the Analytical Work Files (AWFs) contain much 
more sensitive data, such as the contact data of suspects and witnesses and details of 
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specific offences like the use of weapons of mass destruction. For example, one AWF focuses 
on Islamic fundamentalist terrorism.126 The AWFs are accessible only by Europol analysts.127 
With "more than 100" of its total staff of 700 being criminal analysts, "analysis is at the core 
of Europol's activities".128 They use the databases to identify patterns, for example in the 
behaviour of criminal or terrorism suspects that the individual national police agencies are 
not able to discern on their own, lacking the information of other agencies.129 Furthermore, 
the analysts are supported by experts in Europol's specialised units on drugs, bombs, explo-
sives and terrorism.130  
Europol clearly tailors its products to the needs of its respective consumers. Thus, Europol 
mainly produces operational intelligence based on personal data, but also strategic intelli-
gence products like the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports (TESAT) and the classified 
European Organised Crime Threat Assessments (OCTA) to support decision-making.131  
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Figure 6: Organisational chart of Europol 
 
Dissemination 
Europol disseminates its operational analyses to the national law enforcement agencies, 
meaning that the consumers of its main products are identical to those who provide the 
input. As Europol is therefore somewhat likely to draw the same conclusions from this input 
as the national agencies did on their own, some scholars argue that Europol is not really 
adding value but only "paralleling the work of national agencies".132  
However, this reproach is somewhat unwarranted as Europol's strategic analyses are used 
by EU decision-making bodies: for example, in 2010 the Council received seventeen classi-
fied and various unclassified Europol products that became the basis for its recommenda-
tions on the fight against organised crime in Europe.133 
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To conclude, Europol also qualifies as an EU intelligence body according to the definition 
used in this work, as it is, amongst other work, tasked to provide intelligence. 
3.5 Frontex134 
While other scholars so far have not considered that Frontex, situated in Warsaw, qualifies 
as an intelligence body, this last section will argue that it does.135 
Formal EU body tasked to provide intelligence 
Frontex, in operation since 2005, is the second official AFSJ agency of the EU and its role is to 
"facilitate and render more effective the ... management of the external borders" of the 
European Union to ensure its security.136 To fulfil this, Frontex, amongst other tasks, helps to 
coordinate the national border management activities or joint operations, initiates rapid 
interventions, and provides "both general and tailored risk analyses" to the Member 
States.137 It is the latter assignment that makes Frontex relevant to this work. Accordingly, 
Frontex provides operational intelligence mainly via its Situation Centre, whereas strategic 
analyses are issued by its Risk Analysis Unit.138 
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Collection 
Frontex collects its information from various sources. The majority of its information stems 
directly from the Member States' or third parties so-called "border crossing points" (like 
airports or ports), which provide information on illegal border crossings, asylum applications 
and forged-document entries on the basis of a cooperation agreement with Frontex.139 To 
increase this input, Frontex actively pursues further agreements with partners in regions of 
interest for EU border security, like the Western Balkans or Northern Africa.140  
Additionally, Frontex collects OSINT via "constant media monitoring" and from academic 
publications.141 Frontex's own staff deployed in border management operations also provide 
information.142 Finally, Frontex has contracted cooperation agreements with EU bodies like 
Europol, the Commission, and possibly IntCen.143 To increase the willingness of its partners 
to share classified information including personal data, Frontex established in 2011 the so-
called Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN), an information network linking Frontex with 
the Member States' national intelligence agencies and the EU bodies.144  
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Processing and Analysis 
With this input, Frontex's Situation Centre produces various operational intelligence prod-
ucts "on the ongoing situation at the external borders".145 For example, in 2010, it issued 
"500 situation reports, early alert notices, ... 14 mission awareness reports" and Daily 
Newsletters including analysis of where and how many illegal immigrants were likely to 
encounter a specific border section, and alerts of increased trafficking in a certain region.146 
Additionally, since 2011, Frontex has assessed whether the concerned Member State has the 
necessary capacities in resources and equipment to successfully counter possible threats, 
and it may propose the launch of a joint operation if it identifies a capability gap.147  Also in 
2011, Frontex received limited authorisation to process personal data to identify persons 
suspected of being responsible for human trafficking.148  
In addition to operational intelligence, Frontex's Risk Analysis Unit issues strategic analyses 
outlining more general patterns and trends: they monitor "the global security environment, 
especially those political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental factors 
which could affect border security."149 Thereby, the strategic analyses identify risks, predict 
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future trends and make recommendations for policy-making.150 For example, in 2010, 
Frontex produced "10 long-term strategic assessments".151  
Thus, this distinction makes it clear that Frontex tailors its products to the respective needs 
of the intelligence consumers.  
Executive 
Director
Operations Division Administration 
Division
Capacity Building 
Division
Frontex
Frontex Situation 
Center
Risk AnalysisJoint Operations
Managment 
Board
 
Figure 7: Organisational chart of Frontex 
 
Dissemination 
Frontex's operational analyses are directly disseminated to the personnel currently involved 
in border management, that is, national border guards or Frontex personnel in joint opera-
tions.152 There, the situation assessments and early warnings immediately support the 
conduct of operations. On the other hand, while the strategic analyses are equally dissemi-
nated to the national border control authorities, they are mainly issued to support EU deci-
sion-making bodies in the realm of AFSJ, like the Council or the Commission, by identifying 
future priorities of EU border security.153 
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To conclude, the last body examined in this work also qualifies, as assumed, as an EU intelli-
gence body, according to the definition elaborated above. 
3.6 Conclusion on the EU's intelligence capabilities 
In the previous sections, it was argued that five EU bodies do indeed qualify as intelligence 
bodies according to the definition elaborated in this work, as they are formal bodies of the 
EU, tasked to provide intelligence, and engage in the four intelligence activities of collection, 
processing, analysis and dissemination. For example, IntDir's staff members recognised 
themselves as being "de facto an intelligence agency" when they referred to IntCen, SatCen 
and IntDir as "EU intelligence organisations".154   
As it is able to produce its own intelligence via these bodies, the EU benefits from consider-
able advantages: thus, instead of depending on input from national intelligence services to 
support EU decision-making, the EU intelligence bodies (ideally) ensure that good intelli-
gence is provided on all topics of relevance for the EU, even if the theme is not of interest for 
any individual Member State.155 Furthermore, they provide all the members of the EU deci-
sion-making bodies with the same information, which increases the likelihood of a shared 
perception of the situation and thus facilitates the formulation of a common policy.156 Finally, 
EU intelligence bodies ideally aim to promote the well-being of the entire EU, whereas 
national intelligence risks being biased in the interest of the providing Member State.157 
Overall, it can therefore be concluded that the EU intelligence bodies add value by producing 
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various intelligence products tailored to the specific needs of the CFSP and AFSJ decision-
making bodies.  
Accordingly, while one might criticise the EU intelligence bodies' effectiveness or doubt that 
they produce good intelligence that is timely, tailored, digestible, and clear, it seems unwar-
ranted to deny that the EU itself possesses intelligence capabilities in many ways similar to 
those at the national level.158 However, it has to be mentioned that the recognition of the 
EU's intelligence capabilities depends strongly on the definition of intelligence used: thus, 
IntCen's Director emphasised that "there is little prospect for turning [the EU intelligence 
bodies] into ... genuine intelligence-gathering service[s] even in the 'long term'", and some 
scholars argue that the EU has no intelligence services, but only "supranational mechanisms 
for intelligence assessment" or "in-house intelligence capabilities [that] depend on 
intelligence support from member states".159 By portraying these two as an alleged contrast 
 not having collection means versus engaging only in analysis , they base their argument 
on a definition of intelligence according to which the EU's capabilities are not recognised as 
intelligence in their own right as long as the EU bodies do not engage in special powers 
collection of secret information. However, for the reasons outlined in section 2, it was 
chosen to not follow this definition of intelligence in this work. 
Acknowledging that the EU employs five intelligence bodies, one might question which term 
would best describe the EU's intelligence capabilities: can one speak of an EU intelligence 
structure, or an EU intelligence community? As further examples, the former High 
Representative, Javier Solana, wanted SitCen to form the "principal centre for the EU intelli-
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gence architecture", while members of IntDir's staff used the term of an "EU intelligence 
world".160 However, for the following reasons and despite the still-weak formalisation of the 
EU intelligence realm, it is considered appropriate in this work to speak of an (emerging) EU 
intelligence system composed of the five EU intelligence bodies. Thus, as outlined above, the 
CFSP-related intelligence bodies IntCen, SatCen and IntDir are nowadays structurally united 
under the responsibility of the EEAS. This has increased their exchange and cooperation 
considerably. According to rumours, plans are currently being pursued to also establish an 
EU internal security institution similar to the EEAS which would then unite the AFSJ intelli-
gence bodies Europol and Frontex.161 Equally, the EU intelligence bodies themselves increas-
ingly urge for the development of guidelines for an Overarching Intelligence Support, for 
example to the EEAS, that would clarify the respective responsibilities of each EU intelligence 
body within the overall EU intelligence field. Finally, projects are currently being pursued to 
establish secure communication networks for the exchange of classified information be-
tween the EU intelligence bodies and national services, for example the EEAS-wide 
Civil/Military Intelligence System Support.162  Therefore, even if the bonds between the EU 
intelligence bodies are mostly not (yet) formalised, they arguably form an increasingly 
collaborating structure that is united in its aim to effectively support EU decision-making. 
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Overall, it can be concluded from the first part of this work that the EU itself has, even if 
argued otherwise by some EU bodies, an intelligence system, comprising the EU intelligence 
bodies SatCen, IntDir, and IntCen in the realm of CFSP, and Europol and Frontex for the AFSJ. 
4 EU intelligence oversight 
The first part of this work argues that the EU possesses its own intelligence system, as five 
EU bodies engage in intelligence activities. On this basis, it concludes that the Commission's 
statement according to which no "component of the EEAS is an 'intelligence service'" is 
unwarranted.163   
Therefore, the second part of this work examines whether the second statement outlined in 
the introduction is warranted: according to IntCen's Director, there is no need for further 
parliamentary scrutiny of the EU intelligence bodies as they are already sufficiently over-
seen.164 In order to assess this argument, the following sections focus on the EU's provisions 
of parliamentary oversight. To do so, however, it is first necessary to define what is under-
stood by intelligence oversight and democratic accountability. 
4.1 The concepts of intelligence oversight and democratic accountability 
Oversight "refers to an actor scrutinizing an organisation's ... activities with the aim of 
evaluating its compliance with particular criteria and on this basis, issuing recommendations 
or orders".165  Thereby, oversight aims, for example, to improve the efficiency and effective-
ness of the organisations performance, to prevent abuse or illegal conduct, to protect civil 
                                                          
163
  COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2010d): 'EU Observer article of 22 February 2010'. Answer to written 
question E-1131/10 put by Martin Ehrenhauser, Brussels, 3 May 2010. 
164
  RETTMAN, Andrew (2011e): EU intelligence bureau sent officers to Libya in EU Observer, 12 April 2011. 
165
  WILLS, VERMEULEN, BORN, SCHEININ, WIEBUSCH (2011): Parliamentary oversight of security and intelligence 
agencies in the European Union, p.41. 
42 
 
liberties, and to generally ensure that the overseen body acts according to the public will.166 
Accordingly, intelligence oversight means that an intelligence body is reviewed, for example, 
with regard to its activities, personnel management, budgetary use, or legal framework in 
order to prevent bad behaviour and improve its performance.167  Intelligence oversight can 
be exercised by a variety of actors, like executive institutions, internal oversight bodies, 
courts, the public and media, or the parliament.168  However, too much oversight hampers 
the intelligence service's performance as it binds resources, while too little oversight may 
promote unlawful behaviour or poor-quality intelligence.169  Therefore, good oversight 
needs to be carefully balanced between these two extremes.170  
Within intelligence oversight, parliamentary oversight has a somewhat special position. Prior 
to the 1970s, it was common practice not to include parliaments in intelligence oversight as 
the latter was seen as the exclusive prerogative of executive and judicial actors. 171 However, 
various abuses by the government, for example of the US intelligence services, changed this 
perception: thus, nowadays, "parliamentary oversight of intelligence services has become an 
international norm ... for democracies" that mainly aims to counterbalance the executive's 
influence on intelligence and have a checking and balancing effect.172 Additionally, as a 
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representative of the people, the parliament is seen as best able to ensure by its oversight 
that intelligence activities are in accordance with the public will.173  Therefore, most scholars 
nowadays deem it best practice for the parliament to engage in extensive, continuous, broad 
intelligence oversight, even if this is in practice, even in Western states, not always real-
ised.174  
The concept of democratic accountability is closely related to the notion of parliamentary 
oversight. Democratic accountability is composed of two elements.  Firstly, 'being 
accountable' means that a body entrusted with a certain responsibility or task has to give 
account - that is, give answer for how it exercises its duties - to the entrusting principal.175  
Secondly, because in a democracy all state authority emanates from the people, the people 
is this entrusting principal. Accordingly, democratic accountability means that all actors 
exercising state authority, including intelligence services, are ultimately accountable to the 
people or to their representatives in the parliament. Through conducting oversight, the 
parliament or citizens demand democratic accountability from an intelligence body. Thereby, 
they aim to ensure that "no ... decision is taken without or against the will of the people" 
and that the intelligence activities serve the public interest.176 As a side effect, democratic 
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accountability helps to ensure the legitimacy and public acceptance of the intelligence 
bodies as the citizens perceive them to be 'in their control'.177   
To conclude, democratic accountability in the sense used in this work refers only to specific 
actors  the parliament and the citizens  engaging in oversight.178  According to WILLS, it is 
nowadays an internationally-accepted norm that intelligence bodies in general should be 
subject to oversight and be held democratically accountable, just like any other state body 
or function.179  Thus, being provided with its own intelligence system, the EU should also 
ensure its oversight and democratic accountability, including the appropriate parliamentary 
scrutiny of the EU intelligence bodies. 
4.2 Actors of parliamentary EU intelligence oversight  
While probably agreeing with the general need for overseeing intelligence, IntCen's Director 
argues that the current provisions of parliamentary oversight of the EU intelligence bodies 
are adequate.180  In the following, it is therefore assessed whether this is indeed the case.  
However, there is no universally-accepted standard of good oversight that would indicate 
the perfect degree of parliamentary oversight for the EU intelligence bodies.181  Hence, it is 
impossible to objectively determine in this work whether the parliamentary oversight in 
place is perfectly adequate. 182  Therefore, the following sections instead are limited to 
outlining the provisions currently in place for the parliamentary oversight of the EU 
intelligence bodies. Should thereby weaknesses or flaws be identified, this will be taken as 
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an indication that, in contrast to the Director's opinion, the parliamentary oversight of the 
EU intelligence bodies is not adequate but needs improvement. 
At EU-level, parliamentary oversight can be executed by the European Parliament (EP) and 
by the national parliaments (NPs) of the EU Member States. There are three preconditions 
for them to be able to engage in effective oversight: firstly, they need to be provided with 
sufficiently experienced staff, resources and expertise. Secondly, they need to be provided 
with the necessary legal mandate and powers, such as the authority to start their own 
investigations, to oversee all topics requiring scrutiny of all intelligence bodies, and to access 
the necessary classified information. Finally, the members of parliament engaging in over-
sight need to have the appropriate attitude and be willing to pro-actively, continuously and 
thoroughly scrutinise the EU intelligence bodies.183   
Therefore, the EP's and NPs' performance in parliamentary oversight of the EU intelligence 
bodies will be examined on these three preconditions  ability, authority, and will - with 
regard to various issues where parliamentary oversight is required. However, prior to focus-
ing on specific topics, the general oversight capabilities of the EP and NPs are outlined. 
4.2.1 The EP's oversight committees 
The EP as a whole is likely to lack both the time and expertise for continuous in-depth intelli-
gence oversight. Accordingly, this task should ideally be referred to special committees 
focusing exclusively on intelligence oversight, to give this issue the attention it requires.184 
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In the field of CFSP, the EP has three committees that might engage in intelligence oversight 
according to their general mandate: in addition to a Special Committee whose tasks and 
capabilities are not outlined in this but in the following section, there is the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs (AFET), and especially its Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE), 
which currently comprises 31 members.185 However, neither of the latter two is provided 
with the necessary staff, resources and conditions to effectively engage in the oversight of 
the EU's intelligence bodies. Thus, while AFET is broadly mandated to oversee the High 
Representative on her conduct of the CFSP and EEAS, it thereby rarely focuses on her 
conduct of intelligence activities specifically, as its mandate is so broad.186  Overall, AFET 
apparently does not even perceive intelligence oversight as its task. Equally, SEDE also barely 
focuses on intelligence oversight because, as a subcommittee, it has to follow the priorities 
of scrutiny set by AFET.187 Additionally, AFET's and SEDE's meetings are generally held in 
public and only in exceptional cases in camera.188 However, members of the EU intelligence 
bodies are fairly unlikely to discuss sensitive intelligence information in a public forum.189   
In the field of AFSJ, the oversight responsibility is likely to fall within the scope of the 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), responsible for the protection 
of citizens rights, transparency, the protection of personal data, and police and judicial 
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cooperation.190  However, like AFET, LIBE is unlikely to give intelligence oversight the neces-
sary attention as its mandate is very general and broad.  
To conclude, several flaws can be found with regard to the EP's committees engaging in 
intelligence oversight.  Unlike identified as good oversight practice, the EP executes intelli-
gence oversight not in specialised committees focusing exclusively on intelligence oversight, 
but through general parliamentary committees. 191   Their members are 'normal' 
parliamentarians and therefore likely to lack the necessary expertise in intelligence to 
conduct thorough oversight.192 Furthermore, AFET, LIBE and SEDE are tasked with the over-
sight of a multitude of other topics, so that intelligence is possibly not given the necessary 
focus. Overall, the EP is thus not provided with the ideal resources for engaging in effective 
intelligence oversight.  
4.2.2 The EP's access to classified information 
Having examined the EP's committees likely to be used to engage in the oversight of the EU 
intelligence bodies, this section focuses on a further point determining their effectiveness: 
access to classified information.  
As mentioned above, a necessary precondition for effective parliamentary oversight is that 
the parliament has sufficient access to (probably classified) information about the intelli-
gence body's activities.193  Accordingly, the EP would be best able to scrutinise the EU intelli-
gence bodies in depth if it had the right to request all information on all topics it deems rele-
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vant, and if the intelligence bodies had to comply with all information requests.194  However, 
the intelligence bodies equally have a valid interest in keeping certain information secret in 
order to protect sensitive sources, methods, or ongoing operations which would become 
ineffective if they were publicly known.195 Therefore, the intelligence bodies' needs for 
secrecy have to be carefully balanced against the parliament's needs for transparency to 
enable both to effectively engage in their tasks.196  The question assessed below is therefore 
whether the regulations granting the EP access to classified information on EU intelligence 
activities are broad enough that it can engage in effective parliamentary oversight. 
The EP's access to information in CFSP 
To begin with, the EP's access to classified information in the realm of CFSP is examined. In 
2001, the EU introduced the classification levels "TOP SECRET UE", "SECRET UE", 
"CONFIDENTIEL UE" and "RESTREINT UE" to improve the protection of its sensitive informa-
tion.197  Most information on EU intelligence activities falls within one of these classification 
levels and is therefore not easily accessible for members of the EP.198 Instead, the EP's 
access to such classified documents has to be regulated in inter-institutional arrangements 
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with whichever EU body holds the documents.199 This was done in inter-institutional 
arrangements between the EP and the Council in 2002, and the EP and the Commission in 
2005 and 2010.200   
Being an independent but joint institution of the Commission and Council, the EEAS has a 
"hybrid status". Therefore, it was to begin of its activities in 2011 unclear whether the EP's 
access to EEAS classified documents  and thereby to information relating to the CFSP 
intelligence bodies SatCen, IntDir and IntCen  would be regulated by the provisions of the 
inter-institutional agreement with the Council, or with the Commission.201  However, by now, 
it seems clear that the EP's access to EEAS' information is granted by its arrangement with 
the Council, which unfortunately includes the more restrictive provisions.202 In this inter-
institutional arrangement, the EP is granted access to secret information on a 'need-to-
know' basis: the EP may access such information "where it is required for the exercise of the 
powers conferred to the European Parliament", but for no other reason.203 Thus, the EP's 
access to classified information depends on which functions and tasks it has in a given policy 
area. Unfortunately, in the CFSP legislative procedure, the EP has only very limited 
responsibilities: it only needs to be consulted, while the Council alone has the authority to 
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legislate.204 Accordingly, its 'need-to-know' is equally very restricted in CFSP, and therefore 
the EP's committees AFET and SEDE are granted virtually no access at all to classified 
information on CFSP intelligence activities.    
In practice, this lack of information amounts to the EP's "greatest impediment to effective 
oversight", as it makes the in-depth scrutiny of the CFSP bodies' activities or performance 
impossible or useless due to the lack of data.205 However, the cause of this restricted 
information access is also partly to be found within the EP itself, as it "has not yet adopted 
the necessary information security standards" that the Council set as a precondition for 
information sharing, even though it has been invited several times to do so.206 
The EP's Special Committee 
The previous section outlines why the members of the EP in AFET and SEDE usually have no 
access to classified information in the realm of the CFSP. However, for five security-cleared 
parliamentarians, there is an exemption from this rule as they are members of the so-called 
Special Committee. 
The Special Committee was established on the basis of the inter-institutional arrangement 
between the Council and the EP and meets every six weeks with the High Representative.207  
It comprises the three chairmen of AFET, SEDE, and DROI (the second of AFET's subcommit-
tees, focusing on Human Rights) plus two other members of the EP chosen by all political 
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groups.208 At the request of AFET's chairman, the High Representative should inform these 
five parliamentarians of the content of classified CFSP documents.209 Hence, the Special 
Committee is "currently the only mechanism available to the EP" for truly discussing the 
CFSP intelligence bodies' activities on the basis of classified information.210  
However, the theoretical access to classified information provided to the Special Committee 
is for several reasons not sufficient for effective intelligence oversight. Firstly, the Commit-
tee's members are not chosen on the basis of their expertise in intelligence oversight, but for 
political seniority.211 Accordingly, they have been criticised for rarely asking the necessary 
questions.212 Secondly, the parliamentarians are "prevented from discussing any of the 
intelligence they receive outside of their narrow group".213  However, as there are only five 
members, they hardly have the personnel strength to engage in thorough intelligence over-
sight.214 Thirdly, they are in practice not really provided with access to all classified docu-
ments in CFSP: instead, they are mostly informed orally of the content of documents by the 
High Representative.215 Additionally, the High Representative and the Council have "the right 
to deny the EP any information [they] consider[] inappropriate to share", thus effectively 
retaining the choice of which information to disclose, and being somewhat able to influence 
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the Committee's focus, depending on which information they provide them with.216 Also, the 
High Representative has to inform the Committee only when so requested by AFET's chair-
man. However, as the parliamentarians are unlikely to even be aware of certain documents 
requiring their oversight, they cannot and do not ask to be informed about them.217 Finally, 
this also means that the Committee's effectiveness and focus depends strongly on the 
engagement and interests of AFET's chairman. Thus, as IntCen "has not been viewed as a 
priority for the AFET Committee", it was, as of 2010, not discussed by the Special Commit-
tee.218 
To conclude, even though it provides one opportunity for some members of the EP to gain 
access to classified information about the CFSP intelligence bodies, the Special Committee is 
hardly provided with the ability and authority to effectively engage in their continuous and 
in-depth oversight. In addition, the necessary attitude also seems to somewhat lack. 
Accordingly, its oversight performance is not discussed in further detail in the following 
sections. 
The EP's access to classified information in AFSJ and to public information 
Similarly to the process outlined for the EP's access to CFSP classified information, the EP is 
also granted access to AFSJ information on the basis of the inter-institutional arrangements 
with the Council and Commission. However, the EP's 'need to know' is much more extensive 
in AFSJ than in CFSP as it has full co-responsibility in the AFSJ legislative procedure. There-
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fore, its access to classified documents on the AFSJ intelligence bodies is much easier.219 One 
could, however, criticise the fact that, as information access is also based on various frag-
mented inter-institutional agreements, there is still a lack of "clear and predictable rules and 
procedures for the EP to access relevant information" on AFSJ activities.220 
To conclude, the EP's members meet some difficulties when using classified information for 
oversight of the EU intelligence bodies of both CFSP and AFSP. Therefore, it makes sense for 
them to additionally base their oversight on publicly-available information. Indeed, SatCen, 
IntDir, Europol and Frontex each run their own official website, providing to different 
degrees information on their tasks as well as contact details for information requests.221 The 
AFSJ agencies' websites include the most extensive amount of information in this respect. 
Additionally, SatCen, Europol and Frontex issue publicly-accessible reports on their budget 
and staff numbers, their annual activities, and their legal frameworks, while SatCen and 
Europol even provide edited public versions of some of their products.222 Finally, while 
IntDir's activities are only superficially outlined on its website, its staff members write arti-
cles for the EUMS's Impetus journal that contain a reasonable amount of information on its 
working procedures.223 To conclude, the publicly-available information on SatCen, IntDir, 
Europol and Frontex provide valuable additions to the secret information and fairly allow the 
interested public and the EP's members to form their own opinion with regard to their 
activities.  
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By contrast, IntCen receives much critique for its complete lack of transparency: it provides 
neither a website, nor are its mandate, staff and budget, annual reports or other information 
publicly available.224  Being thus "unusually secretive, even in comparison to national 
intelligence agencies", even the EP's members have to speculate on its tasks and activities, 
leading to IntCen's image as a "potential European CIA".225  Hence, as IntCen does not pro-
vide any public information and as the EP equally has no access to its classified information, 
the EP likely has de facto not the ability to thoroughly oversee its activities.226 
To conclude, as the EP is not provided with the necessary resources and has, especially in the 
realm of CFSP, not the authority to access classified information, it likely will encounter 
some difficulties while trying to oversee the EU intelligence bodies. By examining the EP's 
actual performance in overseeing specific issues, the sections below will therefore assess 
whether this assumption is warranted. 
4.2.3 The oversight role of the National Parliaments 
In addition to the EP, the NPs should ideally be involved in the parliamentary oversight of the 
EU intelligence bodies, as there are various aspects that are easier to oversee from a na-
tional level than by the EP. For example, the NPs should oversee cases where the Member 
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States directly fund the EU intelligence bodies from their national budgets, and the activities 
of their seconded national agents, as both of these are regulated by national laws.227   
In recognition of this need for the NPs' participation, the EU Treaties do require the NPs to 
help with overseeing the EU intelligence bodies, and explicitly so for Europol.228  There are 
three main possible ways in which the NPs can oversee the EU intelligence bodies. Firstly, 
some NPs have the authority to directly scrutinise the EU intelligence bodies activities  for 
example, the British Parliament issues reports on Europol, has interviewed its directors, and 
visited its premises.229 However, the NPs are generally more interested in themes directly 
affecting their national electorate, and therefore only focus on the EU intelligence bodies on 
an ad hoc basis instead of providing systematic scrutiny.230 Additionally, as their 'need-to-
know' is even more limited, the EU bodies holding classified information on the EU intelli-
gence activities are unlikely to provide them to the NPs.  
Secondly, the NPs could indirectly ensure the EU intelligence bodies' democratic accountabil-
ity by pressuring their governments to take a particular stance in the EU decision-making 
bodies, like the Council, when discussing EU intelligence-related issues.231  However, this 
method can only be effective if the NPs have reasonable advance warning of the issues likely 
to be debated, as the NPs have to first find their own stance on the theme if they want to 
                                                          
227
  HILLEBRAND (2011): Guarding EU-wide counter-terrorism policing, p.509; WILLS, VERMEULEN, BORN, SCHEININ, 
WIEBUSCH (2011): Parliamentary oversight of security and intelligence agencies in the European Union, 
p.147f. 
228
  CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2010) as amended by the 
Lisbon Treaty, Article 88(2)TFEU; COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2009): Council Decision  establishing the 
European Police Office (Europol), Article 33. 
229
  WILLS, VERMEULEN, BORN, SCHEININ, WIEBUSCH (2011): Parliamentary oversight of security and intelligence 
agencies in the European Union, p.66. 
230
  Ibid.; in analogy to MÜLLER-WILLE (2006): Intelligence and democratic accountability', p.497f. 
231
  WILLS, VERMEULEN, BORN, SCHEININ, WIEBUSCH (2011): Parliamentary oversight of security and intelligence 
agencies in the European Union, p.66. 
56 
 
persuade their governments according to their will.232 However, this is, especially on secu-
rity-related topics like intelligence and defence, quite unlikely. Therefore, the NPs are ulti-
mately probably not very effective in influencing their governments' position in the Council. 
Hence, this indirect oversight might be weak, too. 
Finally, the NPs can improve EU intelligence oversight by providing the EP with the informa-
tion received during the oversight of their national intelligence services. To improve this 
cooperation, the EP periodically upholds various inter-parliamentary meetings of the EP and 
NPs: for example, LIBE annually invites national parliamentarians to discuss the AFJS bodies, 
and AFET and SEDE organise meetings on foreign affairs and defence matters.233 Unfortu-
nately, these forums are somewhat ineffective, as they rarely focus explicitly on the intelli-
gence functions of the EU bodies, are not permanently standing and can thus not engage in 
continuous oversight, and because the great number of participating parliaments makes 
coordination very difficult.234  Additionally, the NPs were criticised for not engaging thor-
oughly in this cooperation because they fear a "power drain from the national to the EU 
level".235   
To conclude, several flaws can be identified in the NPs' abilities to oversee EU intelligence: 
they often lack the will to engage in depth on EU intelligence oversight, but neither are they 
provided with the necessary resources nor information access to make an effective contribu-
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tion. Nevertheless, the following sections assess the NPs' actual oversight performance on 
specific issues related to the oversight of the EU intelligence bodies. 
4.3 Specific issues of parliamentary EU intelligence oversight 
Having in the previous sections outlined the general oversight resources and capabilities of 
the EP and the NPs, the following sections examine specific issues related to the parliamen-
tary oversight of the EU intelligence bodies to determine their respective authority and will 
to engage in effective oversight.  
4.3.1 Mandates of the EU intelligence bodies 
"Democratic control of intelligence services begins with a clearly defined legal framework", 
that is, a mandate.236   According to MÜLLER-WILLE, "the mandate is central from an 
accountability perspective" as it defines what the EU intelligence body may or may not do.237  
Accordingly, without a clear legal framework, it becomes very difficult to oversee an intelli-
gence body as there is "no reference point" against which to measure the body's acts.238  
The institution with the authority to define the mandate's content has a very great influence 
on the intelligence body, as it can determine which activities it is allowed to engage in. 
Therefore, in order to ensure that the tasks and responsibilities accorded to the EU intelli-
gence bodies represent the public will, it is deemed very important that the EP or NPs have 
the authority to influence the formulation of their respective mandates. 239  This co-
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responsibility would furthermore prevent the executive institutions from changing the 
intelligence bodies' tasks or limits according to short-term political opportunity.240  
The CFSP intelligence bodies' mandates 
First, the mandates of the three CFSP intelligence bodies are examined for whether they 
were formulated under parliamentary participation. SatCen's legal framework is fixed by a 
Council Joint Action last amended in 2011.241  While the mandate is publicly available and 
quite clear in defining SatCen's responsibilities, limits and oversight, the Council alone deter-
mined its content while the EP lacked the necessary authority.  
The same applies to IntDir: its responsibilities are outlined in the mandate of its parent body, 
the EUMS, which is a Council Decision of 2008.242  As the EP needs only to be consulted on 
Decisions in the realm of CFSP, the Council is de facto again the sole responsible party for 
defining IntDir's legal framework. In addition, IntDir's activities are defined in the framework 
in only very little detail.  
Finally, IntCen has not been provided with any legal framework whatsoever, but its tasks are 
unofficially set by the Council and the High Representative.243  The reason for this omission is 
thought to lie in the mistrust of the large EU Member States: according to MÜLLER-WILLE, "all 
Member States would be entitled to second their analysts to the centre" if IntCen was to be 
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provided with a legal basis.244 However, as it was outlined in section 3.3, the privileged 
states prefer to have a choice of whom to accept into their circle, in order to protect their 
shared intelligence. Therefore, they allegedly deliberately abstain from issuing a legal basis 
to IntCen.245  This complete lack of a legal basis is of course a grave obstacle to IntCen's over-
sight, as there is no reference point to determine whether it is acting according to its 
limits.246  Furthermore, this absence of a written legal mandate might become an issue as 
soon as the EU accedes to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as 
is provided for in the Lisbon Treaty247, because the ECtHR has already ruled, in 1987, that 
intelligence bodies need to be provided with "clear, foreseeable, and accessible" legal 
rules.248   
To conclude, the EP is completely prevented from effectively influencing the mandates of 
the three CFSP intelligence agencies, as it is not provided with the necessary authority. 
Unfortunately, the NPs are no better able to decide the mandates content: while they 
theoretically have the power to indirectly influence the provisions by prescribing their 
Foreign Ministers how to vote in the relevant Council's debate, in practice they apparently 
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lack the necessary influence on their governments.249 Thus, the parliamentary influence on 
the CFSP intelligence bodies mandates is virtually non-existent.  
The AFSJ intelligence bodies' mandates 
In a second step, the parliament's influence on the AFSJ agencies mandates is assessed. 
Until 2009, Europol was based on a treaty signed between the Member States. This changed 
in 2009 when its responsibilities were determined in great detail in an AFSJ Council 
Decision.250  Unlike for CFSP Decisions where the EP is only consulted, the EP had in 2009 the 
right to assent or dissent to AFSJ Decisions. Thus, to enter into force, Europol's current 
mandate had to find the assent of the EP. Accordingly, the EP had a chance to slightly 
influence the mandate's content by threatening not to assent to it otherwise.  
However, in 2009, the Lisbon Treaty amended the AFSJ legislative procedure. Thus, the EP 
has since then been fully co-responsible in AFSJ acts and can, for the first time, propose its 
own amendments to legislative texts. Being in 2009 aware of this coming increase in the EP's 
capabilities, the Member States allegedly adopted Europol's current mandate deliberately 
just before the Lisbon Treaty came into force in order to prevent the EP's full influence.251 
However, a new mandate for Europol is planned for 2013, in which the EP will be able to 
execute its new co-responsibility.252   
By contrast, Frontex's legal framework, a very detailed Regulation of 2011, has already been 
adopted in accordance with the new legislative procedure, under the full co-responsibility of 
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EP and Council.253  However, RIPOLL-SERVENT argues that, instead of taking this chance to 
introduce strong regulations to improve the parliamentary oversight of Frontex, the EP 
abstained from proposing strict oversight as it wants to prove itself to the Council as a 
'responsible' actor.254   
To conclude, the EP's influence on the AFSJ intelligence bodies mandates is in theory very 
good as the Lisbon Treaty provided it with the necessary authority to co-responsibly 
determine their content. However, this legal power is not yet implemented in practice: on 
the one hand, the currently valid mandate of Europol was still subject to the old legislative 
procedure and only assented by the EP. On the other hand, the EP apparently lacks the will 
to enforce stronger oversight means and instead seems to follow the more restrictive 
example of the Council. This shows that having the necessary authority does not 
automatically lead to stronger parliamentary oversight. 
4.3.2 Parliamentary oversight of the EU intelligence budget 
Having outlined the parliamentary influence on the EU intelligence bodies' mandate, this 
section focuses on their budgetary control. In this work, budgetary control is used to refer to 
two activities: on the one hand, the determination of the budgets' appropriate size, and on 
the other hand, the control of whether the provided money is spent usefully and according 
to its purpose.255   
As intelligence bodies are generally funded by public money, it is deemed very important 
that parliaments have, as representatives of the taxpayers' will, the authority to determine 
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the amount and purpose of money accorded to the intelligence bodies.256  Accordingly, the 
EP should be responsible for the budgetary control of contributions paid to the EU intelli-
gence bodies from the official EU budget, and the NPs for the respective amounts stemming 
from national funds.  
The CFSP intelligence bodies' budgets 
To begin with, the parliamentary control of the CFSP budgets is examined. SatCen is directly 
financed by contributions from the Member States, plus payments of third partners for its 
intelligence products.257  Thus, being independent from the official EU budget, the EP has no 
say in SatCen's budget. Instead, SatCen's Management Board decides the amount of money 
SatCen receives and also discharges, on the basis of the report of its own "independent 
financial controller", for its correct use.258  As the Board is composed of representatives of 
the Member States, the NPs are ultimately responsible for the budgetary control of their 
provisions. However, as the individual amounts of national money paid to SatCen are rather 
modest, they do in practice not pay much attention to them.259 Consequently, SatCen's use 
of public money is de facto not overseen by a parliament. 
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Meanwhile, IntDir and IntCen are funded by both EU and national public money: formally, 
IntDir's and IntCen's budget are part of the EEAS budget.260 As the EEAS falls within the EP's 
budgetary responsibility, the EP is in theory entitled to determine the amount of money 
IntDir and IntCen receive from EU funds and also to discharge its correct use after the EEAS 
budget has been audited by the EU Court of Auditors.261  However, for three reasons, the EP 
in practice does not engage in effective budgetary control of IntCen's and IntDir's budget 
despite being legally responsible. Firstly, IntDir's and IntCen's budgets are apparently not 
explicitly outlined within the EEAS's budget plan and auditing report.262 Therefore, the EP 
does not have the necessary authority to freely determine the amount of money they 
receive. Secondly, the EP also seems to lack the necessary will to do so, as it does not 
demand to be informed explicitly on IntCen's and IntDir's budget and use.263  Finally, only a 
small portion of IntDir's and IntCen's overall budget stems from the EU. Therefore, again, the 
EP seems to not be interested in thoroughly scrutinising such comparably very modest 
amounts. 
Instead, the majority of IntCen's and IntDir's budget stems from national funds. The reason 
for this is that, as already mentioned, a considerable part of IntCen's and IntDir's staff are 
seconded national agents  39 out of 41 staff members for IntDir and about 70 per cent for 
IntCen  who are paid directly from national budgets.264  Accordingly, the NPs are de facto 
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better situated for their budgetary control. However, again they are apparently not 
interested in minutely controlling these relatively small amounts of money.265 
To conclude, for all three CFSP intelligence bodies, both the determination of the amount of 
money and the auditing on its effective use is de facto exercised without parliamentary 
control. This is partly because the EP lacks the necessary authority as it cannot control 
SatCen's entire and major parts of IntDir's and IntCen's budget. However, both the EP and 
NPs also lack the will to effectively engage in scrutiny where they are legally entitled to.  
The AFSJ intelligence bodies' budgets 
In a second step, the AFSJ budgets are examined. Unlike the CFSP intelligence bodies, both 
AFSJ bodies are official EU agencies and are thus financed from the general EU budget.266  
For both Europol and Frontex, the respective Director and Management Board propose an 
annual budget whose specific amount is, since the Lisbon Treaty, jointly accepted by the 
Council and the EP.267 Equally, the EP is responsible for discharging Europol's and Frontex's 
Director for the correct implementation of the budget, based on the recommendation 
included in the auditing report of the EU Court of Auditors.268 Unlike the EEAS budget, 
Europol's and Frontex's budget is thereby subject to very thorough and detailed scrutiny by 
the EP, which has "formidable budgetary powers" over Europol and Frontex.269  
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To conclude, as the AFSJ budgets are effectively controlled by the EP, no flaws can be identi-
fied with regard to the parliamentary oversight of their use of public money.  
4.3.3 Parliamentary oversight of data-protection regulations and information-sharing 
In this section, a third question requiring particular attention when overseeing intelligence is 
the use of personal data, meaning "information about a given individual" such as their 
contact details, date of birth, and information on their private life or political beliefs.270  The 
abuse or unwarranted disclosure of such information may be very hampering to this 
person's private life, employment or even overall well-being.271 Therefore, it is highly neces-
sary firstly to provide intelligence bodies handling personal data with clear regulations on 
what types of personal data may be collected, when they may be used, how long they may 
be retained, who has access to them and with whom they may be shared, and secondly to 
effectively ensure that these data protection provisions are complied with.272   
As representatives of the public will, parliaments should be able to determine the basic 
choices of the named data protection provisions and information-sharing agreements of the 
EU intelligence bodies engaging in the use of personal data as this reflects the EU's overall 
stance on citizen and human rights.273  Equally, the parliaments should engage in their 
control to a degree that general flaws can be identified, discussed, and ideally solved. 
However, as it would likely overstretch their capacities, the parliaments should not have to 
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scrutinise each bit of shared information or personal data with regard to its correct use.274 
This is rather incumbent on executive or internal oversight bodies. 
Of the EU intelligence bodies, only two are officially entitled to process personal data: 
Europol and Frontex.275  Thus, Europol's Analytical Work Files contain sensitive data on 
victims and criminal suspects, while Frontex has at its disposal personal data on illegal immi-
grants entering the EU.276  In their mandates, both were provided with fairly strict limits on 
the processing and use of this information; for example, Frontex has to depersonalise all 
data used in its risk analyses.277  Equally, both issued various internal codes of conduct to 
implement human rights and personal data protection. 
As outlined above, the EP had some influence on the mandates' and other regulations' 
content and is also likely to have influenced the included data protection provisions. Also, as 
LIBE's main task is the protection of civil liberties and rights, it engages in the scrutiny of 
their actual implementation. However, as LIBE was rightly not provided with full access to 
the personal data processed by Europol and Frontex, it cannot really oversee on a case-by-
case basis whether they are used according to the data protection provision, but can only 
see general trends like their storage. Similarly, while Europol informs the EP about the fact 
that a new sharing agreement was concluded, the EP is not provided with the authority to 
scrutinise its content or oversee its implementation in practice.278 Therefore, it would be 
very sensible for LIBE if it was to benefit from the insights of other oversight actors, like 
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internal and executive bodies, that have better information access on the use of personal 
data and information sharing. For example, the Joint Supervisory Body (JSB) of Europol is 
such a body. 
The JSB oversees the processing of personal data by Europol. It is composed of two 
representatives of each Member States national body tasked with supervising the national 
inputs to Europol.279  The JSB meets four times a year in camera to confidentially discuss 
Europol's use of personal data, but also acts as an appellate body for persons who request 
access, correction, or deletion of data from Europol's files.280 It is proactively supplied by 
Europol with all documents and data in its possession and may carry out ad hoc inspections 
of all Europol premises where personal data is being processed.281 If the JSB thereby identi-
fies violations of the data protection provisions, it issues propositions of how to solve the 
issues, which are "nearly always implemented".282 Equally, the JSB issues an opinion to 
Europol's Management Board prior to the conclusion of an information-sharing agreement 
on whether the future partner "maintains an adequate level of data protection".283 Finally, 
on the basis of its insights, the JSB provides very detailed biannual reports that raise issues 
requiring further attention and identify ongoing flaws in Europol's processing of personal 
data. 
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As outlined above, it would be very sensible practice for the EP to use these reports on data 
protection or information-sharing agreements for its own oversight. However, the JSB's 
reports have "attracted surprisingly little interest from the EP", and the EP has never invited 
JSB members to discuss the weaknesses found.284   
To conclude, while already provided with some authority, the EP apparently lacks the will to 
engage in in-depth parliamentary oversight of some aspects the AFSJ agencies' data 
protection. Therefore, the parliamentary scrutiny could still be improved.  
4.3.4 Parliamentary scrutiny of the EU intelligence bodies' activities 
In the previous sections, several specific questions related to the NPs' and EP's parliamentary 
oversight of the EU intelligence bodies were assessed. However, it has not yet been exam-
ined whether the EP has the authority and will to engage in continuous and in-depth over-
sight of the EU intelligence bodies' activities in order to ensure that they act according to the 
limits of their mandates, pursue the public will and ultimately produce products that meet 
the standard of good intelligence. Hence, it remains to outline the EP's scrutiny of each of 
the bodies in detail.  
The CFSP intelligence bodies' scrutiny 
As was outlined above, the EP's access to classified data is in the realm of CFSP very limited. 
Hence, it can be expected that its capabilities to oversee the activities of the CFSP intelli-
gence bodies are also rather restricted. 
In SatCen's mandate, the EP is mentioned only once, in the statement that the Council 
forwards SatCen's annual report to the EP.285  Other than that, there is no legal basis for the 
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EP to oversee SatCen's activities. Still, SEDE states that it "pays attention" to SatCen and has 
(instead of AFET) the right to receive SatCen's Director for questioning on his lead of 
SatCen.286  However, SEDE does not seem to use this right to engage in thoroughly oversee-
ing SatCen's activities: according to SEDE's documents, SatCen was discussed only in 2005, 
2008, and 2010 and thus seems to have raised interest only at very distant intervals.287  
Accordingly, SEDE provides ad hoc rather than continuous scrutiny of SatCen's activities. 
Additionally, one can find a PowerPoint Presentation from 2010 in which SatCen's Director 
explains to SEDE the general tasks, funding and functions of SatCen at utmost basic level and 
in very general terms.288  However, if SEDE needed to be provided with such basic informa-
tion about SatCen when it had already been an official EU organ for nine years, SEDE's mem-
bers hardly seem to have the expertise necessary to conduct in-depth oversight or pose 
critical questions about its activities. 
IntDir's oversight by the EP is apparently equally weak, as the EP is not mentioned even once 
in its legal framework. Additionally, while SEDE states that it has "established contacts and 
visits [to] ... the EU Military Staff" and is responsible for receiving the EUMS's Director, it is 
rather doubtful that SEDE focuses during these visits on IntDir's activities in particular.289  
Apart from this, SEDE oversees the EU Military Committee which issues operational guidance 
to the EUMS.290  However, no documentation whatsoever was found that would indicate 
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that the EP thereby indirectly oversees IntDir's intelligence activities. Thus, overall, IntDir 
seems not to be subject to the EP's in-depth and regular parliamentary scrutiny. 
Finally, due to the lack of a legal framework for IntCen, the EP has no treaty-based mandate 
whatsoever to oversee its activities. Because of this, unlike SatCen and IntDir, SEDE cannot 
summon IntCen's Director for questioning on his conduct of IntCen, and does not mention 
IntCen at all when describing its activities.291  Thus, IntCen seems to be completely outside of 
the EP's oversight scope. However, while the possibilities for parliamentary oversight of 
IntCen are indeed very limited, the EP is apparently also not willing to engage in its oversight: 
thus, instead of using the indirect possibility for scrutinising IntCen via the control of the 
EEAS, "neither of these committees [SEDE and AFET] has taken a clear interest in overseeing 
the work" of IntCen and "there is very limited awareness within the EP about the general 
mandate and powers of [IntCen], let alone more specific information".292  These quotations 
make the EP's lack of expertise for overseeing IntCen sufficiently clear. In addition, IntCen 
apparently actively opposes itself to being scrutinised by the EP. For example, IntCen's 
representative reminded the national delegations in a Council meeting that reference should 
not be made to IntCen in the public versions of the meeting agenda  a practice which fur-
ther hampers IntCen's already very limited transparency.293 Equally, the statement of 
IntCen's Director that "there is no need for parliamentary scrutiny of [IntCen]" clearly out-
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lines its defiance of being parliamentary overseen.294  This opposition, together with the lack 
of authority and will by the EP, provide IntCen de facto with absolute absence from undergo-
ing any parliamentary scrutiny of its activities.295  
To conclude, the EP is not provided with the necessary legal authority to continuously and 
in-depth oversee the intelligence activities of the CFSP bodies, and additionally lacks the will 
to do so. Consequently, there does not exist any effective parliamentary oversight of the 
CFSP intelligence bodies. 
The AFSJ intelligence bodies' scrutiny 
In contrast to CFSP, the EP is co-responsible in the AFSJ legislative procedure. As outlined 
above, it consequently has much better access to information on the AFSJ agencies' intelli-
gence activities.296    
Beginning with Europol, LIBE has the right to summon Europol's Director and Management 
Board for questioning, and can also summon the Council with regard to its lead of 
Europol.297  Furthermore, LIBE is extensively provided with information on Europol's activi-
ties, for example during its visits to Europol's premises or included in Europol's budget plans, 
annual working programmes, reports on its activities, and the biannual reports of the JSB.298  
LIBE is thus provided with the necessary legal authority to engage in thorough, continuous 
oversight of Europol's activities. However, it is apparently not willing to strictly enforce its 
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capabilities: as mentioned above, the EP does not seek to consult the JSB on its insights, and 
the members of LIBE were criticised for being too "ill-prepared to ask pertinent questions 
when meeting with Europol's Director.299 Overall, the EP thus does not oversee Europol as 
thoroughly as it possibly could.  
Quite similarly, the EP is entitled to strong oversight capabilities on Frontex, receives all its 
annual reports, working programmes, and budgetary plans, and may invite Frontex's 
Director to question him "on the carrying out of his/her tasks".300 However, when scrutinis-
ing LIBE's documents, it seems that it does practically not engage in overseeing Frontex's 
intelligence functions in particular. Therefore, the EP's oversight is again weaker than its 
legal authority would suggest.  
To conclude, while the EP's oversight of the AFSJ agencies could be considerably better than 
that of the CFSP intelligence bodies as it is provided with the necessary legal authorities, 
LIBEs identified lack of interest in focusing on its intelligence functions ultimately weakens 
its parliamentary intelligence oversight. Accordingly, the parliamentary scrutiny of the AFSJ 
agencies does in practice not meet its theoretical good standard. 
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4.4 Conclusion on the parliamentary oversight of the EU intelligence bodies 
The second part of this work has attempted to assess whether the parliamentary oversight 
of the EU intelligence system is indeed, as argued by IntCen's Director, sufficient and thus 
needs no further improvement. Towards this aim, the different provisions of the NPs' and 
EP's oversight currently in place were outlined in order to examine them for flaws and weak-
nesses.  
By doing so, a multitude of flaws were identified that prevent both the NPs and EP from 
engaging in effectively overseeing the EU intelligence bodies' mandates, budgets, data 
protection activities, and general activities.301 Hence, the argument of IntCen's Director is 
clearly unwarranted. Instead, it was shown that the parliamentary oversight of the EU intelli-
gence system needs to be improved in order to meet the international norm according to 
which, nowadays, all intelligence bodies should be subject to adequate oversight and be held 
democratically accountable.302 
However, it became clear that one has to distinguish between the CFSP and AFSJ intelligence 
bodies' oversight. Thus, while the EP has de facto no access whatsoever to classified 
information in the realm of CFSP (with the exception of the Special Committee, whose 
capabilities are, however, too limited to allow for thorough intelligence oversight), its data 
access is much less problematic in the realm of AFSJ. Also, while the EP now has the ability to 
influence the mandates of the AFSJ agencies, the Council alone determines the tasks and 
responsibilities of the CFSP intelligence bodies. Finally, the amount of public money provided 
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to the CFSP intelligence bodies as well as its efficient use is de facto not overseen by the 
parliaments, whereas the EP has legally the full control on the AFSJ bodies budget. 
 To sum up, while the parliamentary oversight of the AFSJ intelligence bodies, especially the 
one provided by the EP, is generally fairly good  despite some identified flaws like the lack 
of engagement by the parliamentary members  the parliamentary oversight of the CFSP 
intelligence bodies is virtually absent in major areas.303 This means that their legitimacy and 
democratic accountability is equally very weak. In other words, neither the NPs nor the EP 
can effectively ensure that the CFSP intelligence bodies act in accordance with the public will, 
as they lack the ability, authority and on many questions also the will to engage in effective 
intelligence oversight.304 
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5 Conclusion 
This work aimed to answer two questions: firstly, whether the EU does or does not use its 
own intelligence capabilities, and secondly, if so, whether they are subject to sufficient 
parliamentary oversight.  
To answer the first question, the first part of this work started by proposing a definition of 
intelligence. According to this definition, the term 'intelligence' was used in this work to 
refer to security-related information tailored to the specific needs of a decision-maker. 
Hence, each formal EU body in theory was able to qualify as an 'intelligence body' if it 
engaged in the production of intelligence via the intelligence activities of collection, process-
ing, analysis, and dissemination. Thereby, collection was argued to be performed even if the 
body did not engage in the collection of secret information using special powers. 
This definition was then used to outline the argument that currently, five EU bodies qualify 
as intelligence bodies: SatCen, IntDir and IntCen in the realm of CFSP, and Europol and 
Frontex in AFSJ. On this basis, it was concluded that the EU disposes of an emerging intelli-
gence system as its intelligence bodies increasingly form a unit that supports EU decision-
making with intelligence. 
This insight led to the second part of this work which focused on the parliamentary oversight 
of the EU intelligence system. Again, it was first necessary to elaborate a definition of the 
concepts of oversight and democratic accountability. On this basis, the NPs' and EP's 
capabilities to effectively oversee the EU intelligence bodies were examined, paying particu-
lar attention to their resources and access to classified information, their influence on the 
bodies' mandates and budgets, and their oversight of the data protection regulations and 
general activities of the EU intelligence bodies. Thereby, several flaws were identified that 
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hampered the NPs' and EP's parliamentary oversight, predominantly their lack of ability, 
authority and will to engage in oversight. However, it was found that, while the AFSJ 
intelligence bodies are generally quite adequately overseen, the CFSP bodies are de facto 
"accountable neither to national parliaments nor the EP". 305  Accordingly, the second 
question was answered with the argument that the EU intelligence system is not sufficiently 
overseen, but needs to be improved in its parliamentary oversight.  
The finding of considerable flaws in the democratic accountability, especially of the CFSP 
intelligence bodies, is particularly concerning as they are so obviously in contrast to the EU's 
official commitment "to democracy, accountability and transparency".306 Thus, while the 
European Council recalls in the Stockholm programme that the "transparency ..., access to 
documents and good administration" of the EU institutions are necessary preconditions for a 
good democratic standard, the EU's intelligence bodies clearly do not live up to this ideal.307 
It rather seems that, while the EU has considerably increased its intelligence capabilities, it 
has, in the realm of CFSP, engaged far less in improving the provisions for effective 
parliamentary control.308 Hence, the EU's credibility in the international arena is clearly 
undermined when requesting security-sector reforms in order to improve transparency and 
democratic accountability, as it itself does not enforce these standards with regard to its 
own intelligence bodies.  
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